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and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals’ welfare by 
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1 Introduction
We analyze an optimal public pensions scheme where some individuals have self-control pref-
erences (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004).1 With such utility representation, they tentatively
accommodate two competing desires. On the one hand, they value commitment and would
appreciate sticking to a smooth consumption pattern over time. On the other hand, saving
necessitates cognitive self-control that imposes an immediate cost.
The mental cost of self-control arises because an individual who saves remains aware
of the immediate gratification he could have had by consuming all his available liquidity.
For example, deciding to save $100 today entails immediately depriving oneself from a nice
dinner in a restaurant, which is mentally suffering. Absent any restaurant, the mental cost
would vanish. Additionally, partly succumbing to immediate temptation leaves him with less
cash on hand in the future, a source of liquidity which would have become an eventual source
of temptation. Hence, savings are delayed as the outcome of an inter-temporal compromise
between the benefits of commitment and the mental costs of resisting temptation.
In this paper, we examine how the introduction of self-control preferences influence the
trade-off between two fundamental components of a public pension system: the contribution
rate and its degree of redistribution. The pension regime affects individuals’ welfare by
altering how yielding to temptation (i.e. not saving, or saving less) is attractive. We show
that proportional taxation increases the cost of self-control, and that this adverse effect is
more acute when public pensions become more redistributive.
We find that forced savings, that take the form of mandatory pension contributions and
contributory-based pension benefits, tend to increase the mental cost of voluntarily savings.
It thus partly offsets the beneficial mandatory-savings benefits of the system. The mental
1These are increasingly used, in particular to formalize problems of preference reversals (Noor (2007)), but
also because introspective, empirical and experimental evidence suggest the existence of costly self-control
(Frederick et al., 2002; Bucciol, 2012; Huang et al., 2007; Krussel et al., 2010).
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cost of self-control depends on the difference between what one would have consumed without
saving at all, and what is actually consumed. Distortive pension contributions reduce the
value of both options, but the negative marginal effect is stronger via the latter. It is therefore
optimal for the government — at the margin — to focus less on forcing people to save, and
more on the redistributive aspect of the scheme. Although simple, this underlying intuition
has not yet been pointed out, possibly because no traditional optimal pensions exercise have
yet been done with self-control preferences.2
Despite their appealing features, the self-control preferences have largely been ignored in
the normative taxation literature. Thus, our paper is the first to characterize the tradeoff
between the redistributive and forced-saving roles of public pensions in such context. Ob-
taining tax formulas allows us to present a clear characterization of the effects of taxation
and redistribution on the cost of self-control, and to provide an analytical expression for the
marginal effect of taxation on it.
Also, even though the topic of social security with self-control preferences have been
treated in the macroeconomic literature, our method and results depart from it in several
ways. Although our purpose is to present a normative exercise, and not a calibration, it is
noteworthy that our results lie on joint assumptions that have not yet been tested (income
heterogeneity, endogenous labor supply and endogenous redistribution). A related paper by
Kumru & Thanopoulos (2008) studied numerically the welfare effect of social security as
compared to a benchmark economy populated by time-inconsistent agents. Individuals are
identical (but face idiosyncratic risks). They find that self-control preferences can mitigate
the adverse welfare costs of social security, focusing on the case of a convex temptation
function. Also, (Kumru & Thanopoulos, 2011) shows that the elimination of social security
may not be optimal when the intensity of the self-control problem is high. Bucciol (2011)
allowed households to allocate their time between labor and leisure, but with a pension
system that has no redistributive objective. Solely focusing on a convex temptation ranking,
2Krussel et al. (2010) studied a Ramsey tax problem with linear taxes in a single-agent model, and
advocated late consumption and savings subsidies.
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he concludes that social security can be welfare-improving in the presence of self-control
preferences, also obtaining the special case that payroll taxation reduces the mental cost of
resisting temptation.
2 The model
The economy consists of a large number of individuals who live for three periods. They
differ with respect to their productivity and to the intensity of their self-control problems.
Heterogeneity in productivity is captured by the existence of N > 1 exogenously given wage
rates, which are denoted by wi with w1 < ... < wN . The intensity of one’s self-control
problem is captured by a parameter λj ∈ {0, λ}, λ > 0. As will become clear shortly, an
individual with λj = λ has a self-control problem whereas one with λj = 0 has not. There is
a fixed proportion piij of type-ij individuals. We normalize the total population to one. In
the first two periods denoted by t = 0, 1 they supply labor (Lijt ) and save (s
ij
t ). Individuals
are liquidity constrained, so sijt ≥ 0. This ensures that public pension claims cannot be used
as a collateral to obtain consumption credit (Lindbeck & Persson, 2003). Labor income is
taxed at proportional rate τ. The proceeds of the tax are capitalized at an exogenous market
interest rate r, and are used to finance the pension benefits bij that are paid to individuals
in their old age, at t = 2.
Let us call by cijt the consumption level of an individual at time t. Without loss of
generality, they are expressed net of disutility of labor, which is captured by the strictly
convex cost function ϕ(L).3 Consumption levels are given by
cijt = (1− τ)wiLijt − ϕ(Lijt ) + sijt−1(1 + r)− sijt , t = 0, 1. (1)
3It satisfies ϕ(0) = 0, ϕ′(0) = 0, ϕ′(L) > 0 ∀L > 0, and ϕ′′(L) > 0.
4
and
c2 = s
ij
1 (1 + r) + b
ij, t = 2. (2)
Individuals exhibit self-control preferences (Gul & Pesendorfer, 2001, 2004):
U ij ≡
1∑
t=0
βt
[
u(cijt ) + λ
jv(cijt )− λjv(cˆij)
]
+ β2u(cij2 ). (3)
where cijt is the consumption level one would get if no self-control was exerted at all. This
most tempting option satisfies cˆijt ≡ maxL,s λv(wi(1− τ)− ϕ(Lij)− s). Labor supply under
the most tempting option is implicitly given by ϕ′(Lij) = (1− τ)wi and savings are null.
Redistributive pensions
Let us first introduce the simplified notation Y ij for the value of one’s lifetime labor earnings,
from the point of view of t = 2 : Y ij =
∑1
t=0w
i
tL
ij
t (2− t). Thus, when one reaches retirement
time, his lifetime capitalized contributions to to the public pensions fund are τY ij. Let us
also denote by E[Y ] =
∑
ij pi
ijY ij the average (capitalized) lifetime earnings in the economy.
We introduce the Bismarckian parameter α that captures the tradeoff between the forced-
savings and redistributive roles of the pension system (Cremer et al., 2008). The pension
benefit of an individual ij is a linear combination of his own contributions and of the aver-
age’s:
bij = ατY ij + (1− α)τE[Y ] (4)
The contributory/Bismarckian benefit ατY ij is a forced saving device. The lump-sum/Beveridgian
one is redistributive, since everyone receives it independently of their past income or contri-
butions. Increasing α forces people to save more, a policy objective that conflicts with its
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redistributive counterpart.4 A purely Bismarckian system has α = 1 whereas a Beveridgian
system has α = 0. A pension system featuring α < 0 is targeted since individuals are implic-
itly taxed for their contributions. Such system is very redistributive, but also highly very
distortionary.
Is the mental cost of self-control aﬄicting the rich, or the poor?
Let us recall the main insights provided by the self-control preferences, as expressed in
(3). The function u(·) is just a typical utility function, or a “commitment ranking” which is
strictly concave and meets Inada’s requirements. The function λjv(·) is a temptation ranking
that captures the welfare effect of temptation. Someone who has no issue with self-control
(λj = 0) will want to smooth consumption over his life cycle, provided that β(1 + r) = 1 (an
assumption that we make for simplicity). We call such individual a life-cycler.
For individual with λj = λ, consuming all current cash-on-hand is tempting. Let us
momentarily ignore time and type indexes, and denote by cˆ one’s consumption when labor
supplies and savings are chosen by a perfectly myopic individual. This is the most tempting
option for someone who experiences problems of self-control. Such an individual derives
immediate utility u(c) + λv(c) − λv(cˆ), where cˆ is the most tempting option and c is the
consumption level that is actually chosen, where cˆ > c. It is typical to call λ(v(cˆ− v(c)) > 0
the cost of self-control one imposes to oneself by saving money in the face of temptation.
Before designing an optimal pension plan, it is instructive to refer to the laisser-faire
solution to assess the economic significance of the shape of the temptation ranking v(·).
Over one’s lifetime, the total cost of self-control that will be experienced is
γij = λj
1∑
t=0
βt[v(cˆij)− v(cijt )] > 0. (5)
4Note that the pension plan’s budget is always balanced by definition, as is typical in linear-progressive
tax models.
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Let us call by V ij(wi, λj) the indirect utility function of an individual who maximizes his
utility, and where no public pension plan is offered. Proposition 1 shows that the cost of
self-control increases in wi if the temptation-ranking is convex, and that it decreases with
wi otherwise.
Proposition 1. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, lifetime commitment utility is strictly increas-
ing with respect to wi. However, the cost of self-control is strictly increasing in wi if v′′(·) > 0,
and strictly decreasing in wi if v′′(·) < 0.
Proof: Using the Envelope theorem, differentiating one’s indirect utility function with re-
spect to wi yields
∂V ij(wi, λj)
∂wi
=
1∑
t=0
βtLijt u
′(cijt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆ comm. utility
−
1∑
t=0
βtLijt λ
j(v′(cˆijt )− v′(cijt ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆cost self-control
. (6)
Since u is strictly increasing in its argument, the first term within brackets implies that
commitment utility is strictly increasing in wi as well. For individuals with problems of
self-control, since marginal tax rates are null, Lijt = Lˆ
ij
t for all i. By the definition of the
maximization problem, cˆijt ≥ cijt holds with strict equality if savings are positive in at least
one period. Because u satisfies the Inada conditions sij1 > 0 and γ
ij > 0. Thus, the net effect
of wi on the cost of self-control relies solely on the sign of v′(cˆijt )− v′(cijt ). 
Proposition 1 has important economic features, and has significant consequences for po-
tential policy involvements. Absent any public intervention, the effect of wi on the cognitive
cost of self-control depends on the difference between the marginal temptation-utility of ac-
tual consumption and that of the most tempting consumption level. The difference between
both can take either sign, depending on the shape of temptation, which is itself characterized
by the sign of v′′(·). It is noteworthy that the axioms underlying the self-control allow the
function v(·) to be either concave or convex.5
5The only requirement is that the problem must be globally concave, or that u′′(cijt )+λ
jv′′(cijt ) < 0, ∀ij.
7
For the sake of optimal taxation, the curvature of the temptation ranking v(·) turns out
to be highly relevant. If v(·) is strictly concave, the cost of temptation is more significant
for poorer individuals. Depriving themselves from consuming more than they could is very
costly when they are poor, and the magnitude of the problem declines with income. This is
consistent with Mullainathan & Banerjee (2010) who show that the poor may be more likely
to exhibit a hands-to-mouth type of behavior when fulfilling basic needs is involved. Spears
(2011), Bernheim et al. (2012) and Shah et al. (2012) also reached similar conclusions. How-
ever, assuming that the function is strictly convex may also be sensible. Richer households
facing a higher mental cost of self-control could be consistent with the inability for a rich
person to resist engaging in conspicuous consumption, possibly accounting for the presence
of positional externalities.
2.1 Redistributive pensions
Let us denote by V ij(wi, λj;α, τ) the indirect utility function of an individual ij, which
solves:
V ij(wi, λj;α, τ) ≡ max
{sijt ,Lijt }1t=0
1∑
t=0
βt
[
u(cijt ) + λ
jv(cijt )− max
Lijt ,s
ij
t
λjv(cˆijt )
]
+ β2u(cij2 ), (7)
subject to (1), (2) and to the liquidity constraint sijt > 0, t = 0, 1. As is typical with linear-
progressive taxation models, individuals do not internalize the effect of their own labor
supply decisions on the lump-sum (Beveridgian) part of the pension plan. Inserting the first
three constraints directly in (7), individual decisions are given by the following first-order
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conditions:
[(wi(1− τ)− ϕ′(Lij0 )][u′(cij0 ) + λjv′(cij0 )] + ατwiu′(cij2 ) = 0, (Lij0 )
[(wi(1− τ)− ϕ′(Lij1 )][u′(cij1 ) + λjv′(cij1 )] + ατwiu′(cij2 ) = 0, (Lij1 )
−[u′(cij0 ) + λjv′(cij0 )] + [u′(cij1 ) + λjv′(cij1 )]− λjv′(cˆij1 ) ≤ 0, (sij0 )
−[u′(cij1 ) + λjv′(cij1 )] + u′(cij2 ) ≤ 0, (sij1 )
where labor supply always find interior solutions, but where the two last conditions strictly
equal zero only when the liquidity constraints are not binding. As in the laisser-faire equi-
librium, from (sij0 ) and (s
ij
1 ) above one can readily see that all individuals with self-control
issues delay savings.
The assumptions on the disutility of labor ϕ(·) ensure interior solutions for individual
labor supply. We get
ϕ′(Lijt ) = (1− τ)wi + ατwMRSijt,2 (8)
where MRSijt,2 is one’s marginal rate of substitution between one unit of consumption at
t = 0, 1 and one unit after retirement. Equation (8) exhibits the good incentive properties
of a system that is Bismarckian. When α > 0 individuals reduce their labor supply when
taxed more, but such distortion is partly alleviated because they are aware that a share of
their contribution will be paid back to them at t = 2.
Welfare effect of policies
We can derive expressions for the effect of an exogenous change in the policy parameters,
α and τ, on one’s welfare. We do so by using both the envelope theorem and the fact
that individuals take the Beveridgian component of public pensions as given when making
decisions.
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A marginal increase in α has the following effect on one’s welfare:
∂V ij(wi, λj;α, τ)
∂α
= u′(cij2 )τ
[
Y ij − E(Y ) + (1− α)∂E(Y )
∂α
]
. (9)
Making the system more Bismarckian increases the welfare of those whose lifetime income
is larger than average, by making them benefitting more from their own contributions. By
the same token, it penalizes retirees whose lifetime income was lower than the average’s. The
second effect, this time via the tax-base, is beneficial to all since E(Y ) is increasing in α.
Making the system more contributory has a positive effect on labor supply, thereby reducing
the distortions entailed by income taxes.6
The effect of a marginal increase in τ is somewhat more complex. Taking the derivative
of one’s indirect utility function with respect to the tax rate and reorganizing terms yields
∂V ij(wi, λj;α, τ)
∂τ
=
Consumption smoothing︷ ︸︸ ︷
1∑
t=0
βt[u′(cij2 )− u′(cijt )]wiLijt +
Cost of self-control︷ ︸︸ ︷
wiλj
1∑
t=0
[Lˆijv′(cˆijt )− Lijt v′(cijt )]
+ (1− α)u′(cij2 )(E(Y )− Y ij)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Equity
+ (1− α)τu′(cij2 )
∂E(Y )
∂τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Efficiency
. (10)
The right-hand side of (10) clarifies the four different effects of taxation on individuals’
welfare. The first term,
1∑
t=0
βt[u′(cij2 )− u′(cijt )]wiLijt , is the consumption-smoothing benefit
of taxation. By displacing consumption from early periods to retirement, it increases the
value of one’s commitment ranking unless it induces cijt < c
ij
2 for some liquidity-constrained
agents. The second term, which is of high interest to us, it the effect of taxation on the cost
of self-control γij for j = 1. Its sign, which is not fully characterizable analytically without
imposing functional forms, is analyzed in proposition 2:
6That ∂E(Y )/∂α > 0 can be observed from the first-order conditions with respect to Lijt , although the
comparative statics is highly intractable in our three-period model.
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Proposition 2. Effect of taxation on the cost of self-control. The net effect of
payroll taxation is to increase the cost of self-control for all individuals with j = 1 if v′′ < 0
and α ≥ 0. It reduces it when v′′ > 0 and α ≤ 0. The effect is ambiguous otherwise.
Proof: Appendix.
2.2 Problem of the government and tax formulas
The government’s problem is to choose the optimal values for τ and α that maximize its
social objective. We continue assuming that the social welfare function is weighted utilitarian
and that it assigns a weight ωij on each type-ij individual. The optimal tax problem is rather
straightforward, given the non-paternalistic nature of the policy. Individuals’ perception of
their own welfare is equivalent to their indirect utility functions V ij(wi, λj;α, τ) for all ij,
which is aggregated as such by the social welfare function.7 The government solves
(α∗, τ ∗) ≡ arg max
α,τ
2∑
t=0
∑
ij
piijωijV ij(wi, λj; τ, α) (11)
where α∗ and τ ∗ denote the solution to the maximization problem, and where the pension
plans’ balanced budget constraint is implicitly included in the indirect utility functions of
individuals. Given that the problem is globally concave, interior solutions for the policy
parameters are characterized by the first-order conditions
2∑
t=0
∑
ij
piijωij
∂V ij(wi, λj;α, τ)
∂α
= 0 (12)
2∑
t=0
∑
ij
piijωij
∂V ij(wi, λj;α, τ)
∂τ
= 0 (13)
7This contrasts sharply with paternalistic objectives found with models of myopia or quasi-hyperbolic
discounting (discussed below in this paper) in which the government considers that individuals make time-
inconsistent mistakes in decision-making.
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where the partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to α and τ are
respectively expressed in (9) and (10). Reorganizing the first-order condition allows us to
obtain implicit tax formulas. We denote by ξij ≡ ωiju′(cij2 ) the marginal social value of an
increase in old-age revenue of a type-ij individual. Given decreasing marginal utility, ξij
is decreasing with retirement income and increasing with the welfare weights. The implicit
policy formula for α∗ is characterized by
cov(ξ, Y ) + (1− α)E(ξ)∂E(Y )
∂α∗
= 0. (α∗)
Equation (α∗) reflects the typical equity-efficiency tradeoff in optimal taxation. A neg-
ative covariance term between E(Y ) and his marginal utilities of retirement consumption
strengthen the case for more redistribution (lower α). However, the desirable effect of making
the system more contributory-based counterbalances equity concerns.
The behavioral role of the pension system must figure in the implicit tax formula, which
is:
τ ∗ =
Equity︷ ︸︸ ︷
cov(ξ, Y )
E(ξ)
∂E(Y )
∂τ ∗
+
consumption smoothing effect︷ ︸︸ ︷
1∑
t=0
βtE[ωwtLt(u
′(c2)− u′(ct))] +
self-control effect ≶ 0︷ ︸︸ ︷
1∑
t=0
βtE[ωλ(wLˆtv
′(cˆt)− wLtv′(ct))]
−(1− α)E(ξ)∂E(Y )
∂τ ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸
Distortions > 0
.
(τ ∗)
To clarify how the cost of self-control affects the optimal tax rate, we have divided
the right-hand side of (τ ∗) into two parts. The first one captures the traditional equity
(numerator) and efficiency (denominator) tradeoff that we find in linear-progressive optimum
tax models.
The rightmost term in, which has the labor-market distortion in the denominator, con-
tains two components in the numerator. These are the terms in importance here, be-
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cause they capture the two roles of public pensions that we want to emphasize, namely
consumption-smoothing (commitment effect) and its effect on the mental cost of exerting
self-control. For clarity, both of them are textually identified in (τ ∗).
The social consumption-smoothing benefits are due to forced savings, which helps satisfy-
ing individuals’ commitment rankings. It is generally positive in the presence of individuals
with problems of self-control, unless the society consists of an large number of liquidity-
constraints who end up consuming more during their retirement years than when younger.
Accordingly, the consumption-smoothing benefit of taxation seems to justify higher tax rates.
However, that commitment benefit may conflict with the effect of an increase in taxes on
individuals’ costs of self-control. If taxation reduces someone’s cost of exerting self-control,
that individual will be induced to save more by himself. In such case, the consumption-
smoothing and self-control effects of taxation go in the same direction in the implicit tax
formulas. We find that for a significant family of cases, increasing taxes also increases
individuals’ costs of self-control, thereby offsetting the consumption-smoothing benefits of
taxation.
2.3 Taxation and redistribution increase the cost of self-control:
numerical examples
We provide a numerical illustration of how the forced-savings (commitment) role of the
pension system may conflict with its effect on the aggregate mental costs of self-control in
the economy. The results that are reported are a representative and nuanced subset of the
several simulated experiments that we ran with the model. Given the normative nature of
our optimal tax exercise, one should note that we do not try to calibrate a real economy,
but we rather seek to get a sense out of tax formulas that have no close-form.
The government maximizes a utilitarian utility function, so ωij = 1 for all ij. Wages
13
are distributed according to a beta(2,4) distribution, discretized on the domain [1,4], which
induces income inequality. The commitment ranking is logarithmic with u(x) = log(x) and
the temptation ranking, which is allowed to be both convex or concave, take the CRRA
form v(x) = x1−ρ/(1− ρ). The interest rate and discount factors satisfy β = 1/(1 + r) where
r = 0, and none of our results hinge on this number. We conduct simulations with a strictly
concave temptation ranking where ρ = 0.5 and with a strictly convex one, where ρ = −0.5.
Tables A and B report the optimal policies when v′′(·) < 0 and when the intensity of the
self-control problem is λ = 0.1.We denote by pi ∈ [0, 1] the proportion of individuals who have
a problem of self-control.8 Thus, the optimal policy in an economy riddled with self-control
problems is reported on the first line of the table, whereas that in an economy populated with
life-cyclers only figures on the very last line. For several values of pi, we show the optimal
policy (α∗, τ ∗). Additionally, we report what we call the marginal behavioral welfare effects
of pension taxation, evaluated at the optimal policy. These are the consumption-smoothing
benefits due to forced savings:
1∑
t=0
βtE[wtLt(u
′(c2)− u′(ct))] (14)
and the marginal social welfare effect of taxation due to it affecting costs of self-control
1∑
t=0
βtE[λ(wLˆtv
′(cˆt)− wLtv′(ct))]. (15)
Recall that both of these terms are identified in the tax formula (τ ∗).
As a general finding, we find that the tax rates and the extent to which the pension plan is
contributory increase with both the proportion of individuals who have self-control problems,
and with the intensity of self-control problems. This should seem intuitive, since when the
8This proportion is independent of wages. As discussed earlier in the paper, the relationship between
wages and the intensity of the self-control problems is already captured by the concavity/convexity of the
temptation ranking.
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intensity of self-control problems λ increases, individuals with such problems displace more
consumption towards early periods. Thus, when a high proportion of individuals have self-
control issues, the forced-saving role of pensions is important and a large portion (around
one third) of pension benefits are Bismarckian.
However, as our theoretical results show, optimal tax rate and Bismarckian factors in-
crease with λ and pi because it provides self-control individuals with a forced saving device,
but not because the pension system reduces their marginal cost of exerting self-control.
To clearly observe this, refer to the rightmost columns in tables A and B, which give the
marginal social welfare of taxation do to it affecting the cost of self-control. In both cases,
one can see that this effect is always negative: taxation increases the costs of self-control,
and partly offsets the forced savings role of the pension system. As a logical consequence,
we see that when λ goes from 0.1 to 0.25 (i.e. when passing from table A to table B), the
marginal increase in the cost of self-control induced by taxation roughly doubles. Thus, if
α and τ increase with the intensity of self-control, it is simply because the forced-savings
benefits of the pension system increase accordingly. In this regard, the roles of social security
with self-control preferences is comparable to that under a time-inconsistent, paternalistic
policy.
It is no surprise, however, that the negative social welfare effect of taxation generally does
not fully offset the positive consumption-smoothing effect of the pension system. If it was
the case, the only role of public pensions would be to redistribute income. In such situation,
we would have a purely Beveridgian or a targeted system, even when a large proportion of
individuals has self-control problem.
Finally, in table C we consider the case where all individuals have self-control problems
(pi = 1), and we provide the optimal policy for some very large values of λ. One can then
observe that for reasonably low intensities of self-control problems a larger λ is associated
to more forced savings. However, when λ becomes outstandingly large, the negative self-
control effect of taxation tends to drive α down and the optimal Bismarkian term α∗ starts
15
Table A: Policy and marginal behavioral effects: v′′(x) < 0 and λ = 0.1
Optimal policy Marginal behavioral
effects
pi α∗ τ ∗ Cons. Smooth. Self-Control
1.0 0.3245 0.1592 0.1640 -0.0483
0.9 0.3090 0.1573 0.1363 -0.0427
0.8 0.2849 0.1545 0.1201 -0.0370
0.7 0.2607 0.1517 0.0968 -0.0315
0.6 0.2121 0.1461 0.0623 -0.0262
0.5 0.1565 0.1399 0.0462 -0.0211
0.4 0.0875 0.1325 0.0316 -0.0162
0.3 0.0500 0.1271 -0.0103 -0.0123
0.2 0.0500 0.1250 -0.0631 -0.0085
0.1 -0.3267 0.0978 0.0017 -0.0036
0.0 — 0.0281 — —
decreasing with λ.
Let us now consider the case where v′′(·) > 0. As before, the optimal τ and α both
increase when the intensity of self-control problem increases, and when a larger share of the
population is subject to it. In all the simulations that we have ran we have found that,
for high values of λ, a similar tradeoff as with the concave temptation ranking operates.
However, the effect on the cost of self-control is welfare-enhancing when a small share of
the population has self-control problems, which induces an optimal policy where α becomes
small (redistribution becomes dominant), and taxes as well. This result should nonetheless
be nuanced: in the optimum, taxation increasingly reduces the marginal cost of self-control as
government gradually “gives up” on forced savings an only focuses on its normative objective
(redistribution). So, one can hardly think of pension taxation as a useful device to reduce
mental costs of self-control that are wither very severe, or highly prevalent in the economy.
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Table B: Policy and marginal behavioral effects: v′′(x) < 0 and λ = 0.25
Optimal policy Marginal behavioral
effects
pi α∗ τ ∗ Cons. Smooth. Self-Control
1.0 0.3763 0.1671 0.4957 -0.1020
0.9 0.3794 0.1666 0.4136 -0.0925
0.8 0.3620 0.1646 0.3538 -0.0794
0.7 0.3475 0.1625 0.2849 -0.0676
0.6 0.3250 0.1597 0.2612 -0.0549
0.5 0.2863 0.1552 0.1790 -0.0430
0.4 0.2350 0.1493 0.1714 -0.0304
0.3 0.1850 0.1426 0.0951 -0.0210
0.2 0.0950 0.1338 0.0172 -0.0118
0.1 0.0500 0.1251 -0.0495 -0.0056
0.0 — 0.0281 — —
3 Concluding comments
This paper analyzed an optimal public pension scheme when individuals’ wellbeing is charac-
terized by self-control preferences. We focus on the effect of taxation on the costs of exerting
the required self-control to voluntarily save. We study cases in which that cost decreases
with productivity levels and that where it increases with productivity. We find that the com-
mitment benefits of pension taxation can be offset by it increasing the cost of self-control.
Thus, in a non-negligible and realistic set of situations, the joint presence of temptation and
self-control weakens the rationale for forced savings.
Deriving an optimal-linear pension scheme allowed us to find simple tax formulas and to
characterize the possibly competing commitment and self-control effects of taxation. One
possible criticism of it is its partial equilibrium nature, and the fact that the only source of
distortions comes from the non-contributory part of the pension benefit formula (as is typi-
cally the case with static linear-progressive taxation models). The important element for our
results is that self-control preferences induce a wedge between marginal temptation-utility
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Table C: Policy and marginal behavioral effects: v′′(x) < 0 and pi = 1
Optimal policy Marginal behavioral
effects
λ α∗ τ ∗ Cons. Smooth. Self-Control
5 0.1158 0.1661 1.0481 -0.1172
3 0.1610 0.1668 0.9523 -0.1482
1 0.2839 0.1671 0.7413 -0.1807
0.35 0.3601 0.1671 0.5576 -0.1247
0.25 0.3763 0.1671 0.4957 -0.1020
0.10 0.3245 0.1592 0.1640 -0.0483
of actual consumption, and that of the most tempting option. One should note that this
effect would be robust to a more complex environment, including an overlapping-generation
model with endogenous capital accumulation. One next step in this line of research is to
study non-linear pension schemes, with which this wedge may be relaxed.
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Table D: Policy and marginal behavioral effects: v′′(x) > 0 and λ = 0.1
Optimal policy Marginal behavioral
effects
pi α∗ τ ∗ Cons. Smoothing Self-Control
1.0 0.3600 0.1676 0.4925 -0.0744
0.9 0.3596 0.1662 0.4446 -0.0670
0.8 0.3582 0.1650 0.3856 -0.0595
0.7 0.3500 0.1601 0.4149 -0.0515
0.6 0.3300 0.1580 0.3997 -0.0423
0.5 0.2500 0.1522 0.1750 -0.0144
0.4 0.0500 0.1368 0.1730 0.0134
0.3 0.0496 0.1328 0.0989 0.0110
0.2 0.0000 0.1247 0.0377 0.0109
0.1 -0.1010 0.1150 -0.0403 0.0085
0.0 — 0.0281 — —
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